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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Henry A. Politz*
DISCIPLINE
The volume of disciplinary proceedings before the Loui-
siana Supreme Court continues unabated. During the 1977-
1978 term, three attorneys were disbarred, six were suspended
and two were given interim suspensions pending further action.
At the close of the term, there were twenty-five docketed pro-
ceedings, involving twenty-two attorneys,' most awaiting ac-
tion by or before the commissioners appointed for their eviden-
tiary hearings.' It is apparent that in the next term there will
be more terminations of disciplinary actions than in any prior
term of court.3
One of the three disbarments included the last of the
fraudulent accident ring cases.' The other two proceedings in-
volved disbarment on consent.5 One of the attorneys had been
convicted of a felony in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.' During the period of his incarcera-
tion he had been under an interim suspension order, and upon
his release he surrendered his license pursuant to the disbar-
ment by consent provision. The other attorney had been con-
victed of a felony in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana.'
* Member, Louisiana State and Shreveport Bar Association; Member, Louisiana
Judiciary Commission; Former member and Chairman, Committee on Professional
Responsibility.
1. 26 LA. B.J. 79-80 (1978).
2. Articles of Incorporation, Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, art.
XV, § 6 [hereinafter cited as AiRICLES OF INCORPORATION].
. 3. One cause of delay is the hearing before and report by the commissioners. The
court has begun the practice of directing the time in which this is to be accomplished,
but previously the commissioners had no time frame suggested to them.
4. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Tunis, 352 So. 2d 623 (La. 1977). The four
previous proceedings also resulted in disbarments. See The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Professional Responsibility, 38 LA. L. REV.
453.
5. As provided in ARTICLES OF INCOMORATION, supra note 2, § 11.
6. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Schwartz, 355 So. 2d 543 (La. 1978).
7. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Watters, 355 So. 2d 544 (La. 1978).
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Two attorneys received interim suspensions, i.e., suspen-
sions pending further disciplinary proceedings. One was con-
victed of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,8 and
the other was convicted of theft of a client's funds.' Both con-
victions are now being appealed.
After full disciplinary hearings, two attorneys were sus-
pended. The first had pled guilty to credit card fraud in viola-
tion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,'0 based upon a
two-count federal grand jury indictment." One count was dis-
missed and the plea was entered as to the other. Subsequent
to entry of the plea, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered an
interim suspension of the attorney's license, the commissioner
recommended against suspension for a determinant period
with automatic reinstatement at the conclusion of the period,
and the Committee on Professional Responsibility concurred.
Evidence adduced at the commissioner's hearing reflected the
emotional difficulty experienced by the respondent attorney.
The court, for the first time known to this writer, entered a
suspension for a specified period (three years), but tailored the
order consistent with the recommendation and the psychiatric
evidence adduced and decreed that reinstatement of the attor-
ney would not be automatic.'"
The other proceeding which resulted in suspension,
Louisiana State Bar Association v. Batson, ,3 involved the com-
mingling and conversion of a client's funds. The respondent
had formerly been an attorney for the Louisiana Department
of Revenue and in litigation on behalf of the Department had
recovered the sum of $11,834.72, including $1,075.88 denoted as
attorney's fees. This total sum was deposited in the registry of
8. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Bensabat, No. 60,456 (La. Sept. 1, 1977).
9. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Atkins, 352 So. 2d 605 (La. 1977).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a) (1974); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1948).
11. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Stevenson, 356 So. 2d 408 (La. 1978).
12. Id. at 411. The court ordered:
Respondent may apply for reinstatement after the lapse of the three-year period;
and such application shall be granted by this court, after due proceedings, upon
a clear showing by respondent that he is emotionally able to resume the practice
of law. Absent reinstatement by this court, respondent's suspension to practice
law shall continue in effect.
Id.
13. 359 So. 2d 70 (La. 1978).
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the court and routinely paid out to the respondent as attorney
of record for the Department. He deposited the funds in his
personal bank account and maintained possession of them
from September, 1968, until November, 1971. At that time, he
secured a bank money order which he caused to be back-dated
to September, 1968.1"
The attorney was charged with misappropriation of the
funds. The trial ended with a dismissal at the close of the
State's case. Disciplinary proceedings based on misconduct
were then instituted. Two issues of note were raised: (1) the
effect of the acquittal of the criminal charges based on the
same transaction, and (2) the extent of disciplinary action ap-
propriate under the circumstances.
The attorney argued that since section 8 of article XV of
the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation makes a criminal conviction conclusive proof of miscon-
duct, an acquittal should constitute conclusive proof that there
has been no misconduct. The court found this argument to be
without merit, ruling that "the acquittal does not preclude
disciplinary action for professional misconduct."' 5 The court
went on to declare that it is the responsibility of the Committee
to determine whether the respondent has violated any rule of
the Code of Professional Responsibility of sufficient gravity as
to evidence a moral unfitness for the practice of law. The stan-
dard for determining this is the same whether one has been
convicted or acquitted of a criminal charge. After citing Ethical
Consideration 9-6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,"
the court underscored the charge to Louisiana attorneys in
these unmistakable terms: "Attorneys in this State are held to
a very high standard of conduct. An attorney must avoid the
appearance of impropriety as well as impropriety itself."' 7
The court found that the attorney had retained the funds
after termination of his employment, failed to return them
until an investigation was begun, and then did so surrepti-
14. This money order was subsequently "found" in the Department's files. Id.
at 72.
15. Id.
16. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 2, art. XVI.
17. 359 So. 2d at 72.
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tiously. However, in mitigation the court found that there was
a legitimate question concerning the method of handling the
funds, that there was some approval for retaining the funds for
an indeterminate period, that the funds were returned, albeit
in an irregular fashion, and that in almost twenty years of
practice this was the first and only complaint against the attor-
ney. A six-month suspension was imposed.
Four suspensions were "on consent." By that is meant the
respondent attorney suggested a stated period of suspension as
appropriate discipline for the misconduct charged, the Com-
mittee on Professional Responsibility offered no objection, and
the court concurred. In Louisiana State Bar Association v.
Orrett, 18 the attorney had been convicted of a misdemeanor in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana on a plea to a charge of violating federal and state
corrupt influences statutes. 9 A petition to the Louisiana Su-
preme Court that he be allowed to surrender his license for a
period of ninety days was granted upon an order signed by five
Justices, but Justice Dennis concluded that upon the record
before the court, a more severe penalty would have been appro-
priate. The "no objection" position by the Committee had been
based on what a consensus of the Committee felt to be compel-
ling considerations in mitigation.
The second suspension "on consent" was for a three-year
period, granted by an order signed by five justices. 0 Justices
Dixon and Dennis did not dissent as such but stated that they
would remand for amplification of the record on mitigation.
The attorney had commingled funds from a succession and put
them to his own use. Again, the Committee concluded that the
evidence in mitigation compelled its position of non-objection,
and a majority of the court concurred that the suggested extent
of discipline was appropriate under the circumstances.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Ungar,"' a six-month
suspension was petitioned for by the attorney in a case in which
18. 355 So. 2d 253 (La. 1978).
19. The attorney was convicted of violating LA. R.S. 14:120 (1950) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1948).
20. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Hamnill, 355 So. 2d 934 (La. 1978).
21. 355 So. 2d 936 (La. 1978).
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he was charged with misconduct occasioned by his solicitation
of a personal injury case. Five justices concurred. Justice
Dixon noted his concern, voiced in prior instances,2 that the
mitigating circumstances should be more fully articulated in
the record in such "consent" matters. It is the understanding
of this writer that in future cases the Committee will make as
a part of the record a more detailed explanation of the basis for
its conclusion that the suggested extent of discipline is made
appropriate by mitigating circumstances. It is to be noted that
this six-month suspension for solicitation is twice the period
imposed by the court in the only previous case on solicitation
in which a suspension was imposed.1
Finally, an attorney was suspended on consent for a period
of two years after he had pled guilty to being an accessory after
the fact in an attempted possession of cocaine violation. 4
Walking the furrow plowed in the Stevenson case, 5 the court
ordered that upon completion of the period of suspension the
respondent would be readmitted to practice, but only upon
application made and approved and a showing "that he is emo-
tionally and morally able to resume the practice of law." Oth-
erwise, his suspension would continue.
ADVERTISING-SOLIcrrATION
During this term, there were several other cases before the
supreme court and intermediate appellate courts which may
properly be considered germane to disciplinary and ethical
matters. Of overriding interest and importance is a case argued
during the final week of the term and decided immediately
upon the court's return in September, the landmark decision
of Allison & Perrone v. Louisiana State Bar Association." This
case may be considered one of the first progenies of the now
famous Bates decision. 7
22. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Hammill, 355 So. 2d 934 (La. 1978), and
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Orrett, 355 So. 2d 253 (La. 1978).
23. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
24. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Pastor, 362 So. 2d 486 (La. 1978).
25. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Stevenson, 356 So. 2d 408 (La. 1978).
26. 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978).
27. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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The attorneys, practicing in New Orleans, had made a
mailing to a number of employers in the New Orleans area in
which they sought to contract for the providing of legal services
to their employees. Under the proposed plan, the employer
would deduct ten dollars per month from each covered em-
ployee and remit this amount to the attorneys. In return, the
attorneys would provide certain legal services for the employees
as outlined in an enclosed brochure. The Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility notified the attorneys that an investiga-
tion would be necessary to determine whether their activity
was in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-103.1s The attorneys
responded by petitioning the supreme court for an injunction
against the Bar Association, seeking to proscribe its enforce-
ment of the disciplinary rules on solicitation and advertising.
In a scholarly opinion by Justice Dixon, the court traced
the development of the jurisprudence on prepaid and group
legal services by the United States Supreme Court. This in-
cluded the now famous decisions which have become popularly
referred to as the Button, Brotherhood, Mineworkers and UTU
cases."9 The court's review and analysis included Bates and the
most recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association"0 and In re Primus. 31 The
court balanced and weighed the constitutionally protected
right of free speech and the right and duty of the state to
regulate, in the public interest, the practice of law. The court
found the petitioners' solicitation to be primarily for pecuniary
gain, citing Ohralik, and not as an expression of social or politi-
cal views, as in Primus, and to be distinguished from the public
advertisement dimension in Bates. The court then concluded
that the Code of Professional Responsibility applicable to
Louisiana lawyers appropriately proscribed direct solicitation.
28. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILIrY, D.R. 2-103, which is entititled
"Recommendation of Professional Employment," was amended on December 1, 1977,
to provide for prepaid legal services.
29. UTU v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar
Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S.
1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
30. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
31. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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The court specifically upheld the prohibition against an attor-
ney's direct solicitation for pecuniary gain.
Justice Tate concurred "with very grave reservations."3
Recognizing the value of prepaid legal plans, he urged the or-
ganized bar and the court to study modifications of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which would permit approval of
the offer of prepaid legal service plans, with prior bar approval,
based on the reasonable regulation of the nature of services
offered and the experience and competence of counsel.
This writer is convinced of the correctness of the decision.
This conclusion is based on an analysis of the United States
Supreme Court decisions cited, the Disciplinary Rules at issue,
the facts in the instant case, and the personal knowledge of the
writer of developments in the area of prepaid legal services in
the past decade.3 3 To have ruled otherwise would have required
the court to strike down the 1975 amendments to the Code of
Professional Responsibility which had been labored over for
several years before adoption by the Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation House of Delegates after one of the most vigorous and
extended debates in the history of that institution.3 4 At the
same time the observations of Justice Tate are thoughtful and
reflect considerable foresight. The bar and the court must be
about the business of refining the rules governing both the form
and substance of prepaid legal plans. The 1975 amendments
were a major step, but only a step, and the journey is far from
complete. As experience is gained this major change in both the
funding method and delivery system of legal services must be
given every opportunity to blossom and grow. This is in the
best interest of the public and, necessarily, the ultimate best
interest of the bar.
32. 362 So. 2d at 496.
33. This experience includes six years on the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, three years as a Director of the American
Prepaid Legal Services Institute, and eight years of immediate involvement in the
Shreveport Plan for prepaid legal services.
34. The 1975 amendments to the Disciplinary Rules accompanying Canon 2 deal
specifically with solicitation and publicity.
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BAR ADMISSIONS
In the case of In Re Aleman,3 5 in a four-three decision, the
court directed the Bar Admissions Committee to permit the
applicant to take the bar examination upon his compliance
with all requirements other than that dealing with citizenship
or residence. The dissent noted that the applicant was neither
a citizen nor a resident alien and therfore did not meet the
requirements for admission to the bar. The problem the court
will face if the applicant passes the bar examination appar-
ently remains for another day.
CONTEMPT OF COURT
The decision in City of Lake Charles v. Bell" involved an
attorney cited for contempt and sentenced to jail for refusing
to proceed with the trial of a criminal case in city court. On the
morning of the day of trial (the trial being set for 2:00 P.M.),
the attorney, Parkerson, filed a petition for removal to federal
court. He then advised the court and the prosecutor. At the
trial he argued that the filing of the petition for removal re-
sulted in an automatic stay, citing as his authority 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446.17 The prosecutor disagreed with this interpretation, and
Parkerson, who did not have the text of the United States Code
with him, requested a short interval in which to secure the
volume. The court refused the request and ordered him to pro-
ceed. The attorney declined. The court found him in contempt
and sentenced him to twenty-four hours in jail.
The court reviewed the dispositive jurisprudence which
mandates obedience of court orders, even orders improvidently
or illegally entered. It noted, however, that there are three
conditions which must be met before the rule of unquestioned
obedience applies: (1) the court issuing the order must have
subject matter and personal jurisdiction; (2) adequate and
35. 347 So. 2d 503 (La. 1977).
36. 347 So. 2d 494 (La. 1977). Bell was the defendant in the criminal case;
Parkerson was his attorney.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1948) provides in part: "Promptly after the filing of such
petition . . . the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is
remanded."
[Vol. 39
1979] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978 839
effective remedies must be available for orderly review of the
challenged ruling; and (3) the order must not require an irre-
trievable surrender of constitutional guarantees. A simple
reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) immediately satisfied the su-
preme court that the first requirement had not been met. There
being no jurisdiction to proceed, the city court could not order
the attorney to proceed with defense of his client. Conse-
quently, the court had no authority to cite him for contempt.
ArORNEY'S FEES
The case of Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products8 is a decision
of substantial consequence in the area of enforcement of con-
tingent fee contracts executed pursuant to Revised Statutes
37:218.11 The Fourth Circuit enforced a contingent fee contract
as written after finding that the attorney had been dismissed
without cause and had properly and diligently represented his
client. The court further found that the attorney's efforts were
reflected in the ultimate settlement results achieved by succes-
sor counsel. Heretofore, such cases had been resolved upon
application of the rules on quantum meruit. Concluding that
these earlier decisions resulted from an erroneous understand-
ing of the decision in Succession of Carbajal,10 the court based
38. 353 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 355 So. 2d 625 (La.
1978). See also Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
39. LA. R.S. 37:218 (Supp. 1970 & 1975) provides:
By written contract signed by his client, an attorney at law may acquire as his
fee an interest in the subject matter of a suit, proposed suit, or claim in the
assertion, prosecution or defense of which he is employed, whether the claim or
suit be for money or for property. In such-contract, it may be stipulated that
neither the attorney nor the client may, without the written consent of the other,
settle, compromise, release, discontinue or otherwise dispose of the suit or claim.
Either party to the contract may, at any time, file and record it with the clerk
of court in the parish in which the suit is pending or is to be brought or with
the clerk of court in the parish of the client's domicile. After such filing, any
settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition made of the suit
or claim by either the attorney or the client, without the written consent of the
other, is null and void and the suit or claim shall be proceeded with as if no such
settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition had been made.
40. 139 La. 481, 71 So. 774 (1916). The decision in Carbajal concerned the effect
of revocable attorney-client contracts; the court there held that in pre-1906 contracts
the client could revoke the contract at will and the attorney could recover only on the
basis of quantum meruit.
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the award on the contract itself and not on quantum meruit.
Another Fourth Circuit decision dealt with attorney's fees
and recovery of costs. The attorney in Henican, James & Cleve-
land v. State4 had prepared extensively for trial and spent two
days in trial in federal court, but the attorney-client relation-
ship had reached a point where the attorney requested permis-
sion to withdraw as counsel. The request was denied. The client
then dismissed the attorney, ostensibly because of the effort to
withdraw, coupled with the client's negative reaction to a letter
in which the attorney strongly recommended a settlement.
Counsel sued for the many hours spent in preparation for and
in trial at the agreed rate of fifty dollars per hour. However, the
court denied any recovery for time spent in the aborted trial,
and then made what it styled a "rough guess" of the value of
the pretrial work of the attorney. On the basis of unjust enrich-
ment, it granted judgment for one-half of the time spent. The
decision was based on the court's attempt to gauge the value
of the attorney's effort to the successor counsel and, thus, to the
client. One may debate the wisdom of this theory as there is
much which can be said on both sides. The supreme court will
not take part in the discussion for it has denied writs on the
matter. Of further interest is the court's ruling that copywork
or reproduction (such as Xerox and IBM) done on an office
copier by office staff was not an "out-of-pocket expense," reim-
bursable by the client. Had the work been hired out at the same
cost with payment being made directly by the attorney (in-
stead of indirectly as a part of office operation), the court of
appeal apparently would have allowed recovery as an out-of-
pocket expense. It is submitted that this legal legerdemain is
most interesting but much removed from the realities of the
financial operation of.a modern-day law office.
Finally, a legal malpractice action is worthy of comment
herein. The plaintiff in Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co. 42 sued his former attorney for damages arising from
unlawful confinement in the penitentiary. The plaintiff had
been sentenced to a term of four years for an offense punishable
41. 348 So.2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
42. 354 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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by a maximum sentence of two years of confinement. The court
found that the plaintiff had probably been illegally confined for
eight months. This was arrived at by comparing the probable
parole date under a two-year sentence with the probable parole
date under a four-year sentence, taking into consideration cer-
tain extensions of the parole date because of disciplinary prob-
lems of plaintiff. Reviewing the records, the trial judge found
that six of the "illegal" months were spent at Angola and two
were spent at Camp Beauregard, a minimum security facility.
The court then awarded $7,000 a month for each of the six
months at Angola, "where conditions were poor," and $1,500
per month for each month at Camp Beauregard, "where the
atmosphere was more bearable."'"
The court of appeal reviewed the record and concluded
that the six months spent at Angola rather than Camp Beaure-
gard were a direct consequence of the plaintiff's disciplinary
problems and did not result from any fault on the part of the
attorney. It accordingly modified the trial court's award, delet-
ing the "Angola-level" quantum and awarding $1,500 (the
"Camp Beauregard" quantum) for each of the eight months.
Defense counsel, retained or appointed, should take careful
note.
43. Id. at 720.

